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JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT
CORNELIUS F. MURPHY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
M odern intelligence seeks to bridge the gap between the highest
abstractions and the most concrete experiences. As a result, sci-
ences like mathematics which prove capable of establishing such con-
nections gain in prominence; those without such ability, decline. The
idea of justice has fallen within the latter category. Justice Cardozo's
lament that "they do things better with logarithms" is widely shared,
and is one of the principle reasons why the ideal of justice has come
into disrepute.
The positivists' conviction of justice as an irrational ideal is an
expression of such skepticism. They saw clearly that it is impossible
to deduce a concrete solution from the hypothesis of an abstract norm.
Kelsen emphasized the reality of social conflict; alleged standards of
justice were incapable of demonstrating which interest deserved to be
realized at the expense of any other.' Radbruch overcame some of the
tenets of positivism, but he was one with them on this crucial issue.
The best solution which legal philosophy could offer for jural indeter-
minancy was to illuminate the options available for choice.2 Perelman's
insistence upon persuasive rational argumentation 3 is a contemporary
means of compensating for the fact that the theories of justice fail to
give that concrete certitude which is so desirable to the human con-
sciousness.
Other thinkers have sought to discover what can cognitively be
determined about justice at the immediate levels of concrete conflict.
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law; Visiting Scholar, Harvard
Law School, 1973-74. B.S., College of the Holy Cross, 1954; J.D., Boston College,
1957; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1962.
1. H. KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 4 (1967).
2. See Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in 4 TWENTIETH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHIES SERIES: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASE:, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN 49-111
(K. Wilk transl. 1950).
3. See C. PERELAIAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE -AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUIAENTA-
TION (Petrie transl. 1963). See also C. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE
NEw RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (J. Wilkinson & P. Weaver transls.
1969).
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Convinced that contemplation bakes no loaves, Edmund Cahn turned
attention to the vital reactions of individuals to perceived wrongs.
The "sense of injustice," reflecting operative demands for human dig-
nity and equality, made the antagonisms between people and their
governments to some degree intelligible. Predictable outrage resulting
from abuses of authority such as judicial favoritism, uneven treatment
of like offenses, cruel punishment, or the suppression of inquiry, evi-
denced underlying expectations which illuminated the vicissitudes
of social existence.4
Tillich, noting the disparity between abstract norms and the de-
mands of concrete action, sought to discover whether anything of con-
tent could be discerned at the level of personal encounter. He insisted
that one must first acknowledge the other as a person. Beyond that,
one must look to the cultural process in which he finds himself for
guidance. The interplay between personal conscience and the existing
laws and customs within a society usually provides a substantial foun-
dation for the justice of a specific confrontation. Having exhausted
these positive sources, one cannot revert to structures of natural law
for assistance. Whatever cogency they possess as abstractions is lost at
concrete levels of existence where they become indeterminate and
relative. Rather, one must turn to creative justice, which is love, to
determine what is just in person to person encounters; love listens so
it can truly understand the intrinsic claim of the other; love gives to
such relations whatever of ourselves that can aid reunion; and love
forgives injuries so that those who are estranged from the human
community can again be reunited.
The rejection of justice because of its inability to provide ex-
plicit guidance to concrete adjustments on the one hand, and the ef-
forts to discover meaning within instant encounters on the other, sug-
gest that a leap from abstract norms to immediate insight appears to be
the only way of satisfying the human need for operative certitude. But
the options are in reality not so radical. Modern thought has discovered
other means for illuminating the realm of decision; approaches which
lie between the demands of abstract justice and the requirement of
existential confrontation.
One such method is to view human conflict in sociological terms.
4. For a collection of his writings, see E. CAHN, CONFRONTINO INJUSTCE: THE
EDMUND CAHN READER (L. Cahl ed. 1966).
5. See P. TLLiCH, LovE, POWER, AND JUSTICE (1969).
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Social observation reveals that in human interactions persons and
groups seek to achieve, within different forums, a wide range of values
from varied bases of power and by the utilization of different strategies.
Given these realities, "justice" can be made intelligible only through
a systematic, objective consideration of these social interactions. Scien-
tific scrutiny of these processes makes it possible to determine the na-
ture of these interactions with some precision. By such a technique,
one can discover a broad range of participants in social conflict, ascer-
tain the strategies being utilized to achieve their objectives, and iden-
tify the diverse values which they seek to realize.6
This disciplined approach to problems of human conflict helps
officials prevent an arbitrary projection of their personal preferences
from serving as the "justice" to be applied to controversies they must
resolve or to the content of a public policy they are empowered to
enunciate. The objectivity of social evidence moderates the subjec-
tivity of choice which is an inevitable consequence of human fallibility.
But the process involves more than the passive register of sociologic
truth. When value assertions are discovered, they must be evaluated by
the observer or decisionmaker in terms of the value structure of the
relevant community. The determination of community policy has an
empirical frame of reference. The patterns of official decisions, the
emerging consensus of public preference, and other reliable evidence
are the immediate source of norms which must govern the outcomes
of social interaction. But the science itself makes us aware that there
is in all practical affairs a real dependence upon transcendental norms
of righteousness.
A policy question has an empiric index of meaning; it also implies
a moral significance which is not exhausted by the given community
value structure. Professor McDougal, a leading exponent of sociological
method, brings to his analysis of politico-legal problems the postulated
values of human dignity in a free society.7 But his theories also ac-
knowledge that within that discretion which social truth does not en-
6. Sociological jurisprudence in America begins with the work of Roscoe Pound.
Its current form is provided by the unique methods of analysis developed through the
collaboration of the political scientist Harold Lasswell and the legal scholar Myres Mc-
Dougal. Their seminal work is Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE LJ. 203 (1943). For
more complete bibliographies, see Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myers
McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. Rav. 662 (1968).
7. See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 6.
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close, the philosophical systems upon which the individual is nurtured
will exert their unique influence upon the processes of choice.
If we combine these varying insights we can see how they testify
to the persistent effort by intelligence to attribute meaning to justice
within the obscure realms of human conflict. The different approaches
to concrete experience have overcome the fear that personal efforts to
be just are so many steps into darkness. Yet, this rehabilitation of
practical life has not been a complete success. The field of action now
contains multiple insights important in themselves but without the
coherence of a unified structure. We lack guidance as to the relative
worth of any one approach; we have no comprehensive understanding
of how each fits into an overall theory of judgment. What remains is
the need to make the entire process, from abstract values, through
sociological analysis, to concrete encounter, intelligible as a whole.
Traditional approaches may be of some help. Scholasticism, con-
tinuing the Aristotelian division, delineated two realms of existence:
the speculative and practical orders of life. The former encompassed
all those mental activities in which knowledge was sought for its own
sake; the latter referred to the world of activity. The practical order
was subdivided into the sphere of making-artistic work-and the
field of activity strictly so-called-the domain of ethics and moral
philosophy-where concern was centered upon the proper use of hu-
man freedom. Here the will seeks the good rather than the beautiful. 8
The key to these classifications appears to lie in the presence or
absence of abstract thought; yet the practical order has always been
8. For the distinction between the speculative and practical orders, see J. MARITAIN,
THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGEF App. VII (1938). See also J. MARITAIN, ART AND
SCHOLASTICISM (1962) (contains some reflections on this subject, especially with re-
spect to the distinctions between the artistic and moral aims of practical life). In affirm-
ing the latter distinction, an absolute dichotomy between the good and the beautiful
is not implied. Nevertheless, the distinction is a real one, for in pursuit of the good it
is the perfection of the subject rather than that of the object which is emphasized (al-
though with justice, focus is upon the other and his due). The use which an indi-
vidual makes -of his freedom-how he conducts himself-is the object of moral study;
art, a concern with making, rather than doing, has as its end not the ethical improve-
ment of the person but rather the work to be fashioned. Moreover, distinguishing the
good from the beautiful accentuates the fact that ethics requires judgment, the ability
to make up one's mind decisively and carry out what one has decided. The contempla-
tive response to beauty (including an interest in justice because it is an attractive
idea), can be accompanied by an irresoluteness, an incapacity for the arduous efforts
which are necessary to realization of the ideal. On the other hand, the creative re-
sponse to actual needs which is the essence of judgment reflects both goodness and
beauty.
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understood as possessing a speculative dimension. In art the intellec-
tual presence is intense, but abstract intelligence is also engaged in
the work of ethics. In some aspects of moral philosophy abstract reflec-
tion plays a major role; in others, practical considerations, immediate
existential components, predominate.
The practical order is increasingly concerned with action for its
own sake; the search for justice must culminate in personal choice
or decision. Whatever of value can be said of justice at the level of
abstraction, we are naturally more concerned with its existential
modalities. But if we think of the process as being at once speculative
and practical we can attain a fairly stable understanding of what is
involved when one makes decisions. Viewed as a mixture of reflective
cognition and immediate needs we can avoid the danger of leaping
blindly from value postulates to arbitrary choice. And if we see that
the realm of the practical order is replete with intelligible possibili-
ties-both moral and sociological-we may avoid taking too narrow
a view of the extent to which decisionmaking can be understood.
Rather than replace remote hypothesis with immediate insights, we
may gain a deeper understanding of the broader waves of practical
knowledge which bear upon the potentials of personal commitment.
Some structural continuity can be acquired by placing the realm
of action within this larger framework, yet we are still unenlightened
concerning the more crucial questions of personal choice. Our summary
of sociological jurisprudence included a margin of indeterminancy
which allowed the actor to join his personal value structure to his
scientific appraisal of social interactions. But the precise relationship
between perceived and personal values, and their combined influence
upon final choice, was not explicated.
If guidance is sought from the subjective tradition of justice,
personal norms originating within the autonomous self would become
the decisive feature in human judgment. All that can be demanded is
that the individual defend his jural options by the procedures of ra-
tional argument Such a requirement is highly desirable, but it does
not exhaust the possibilities of determining whether actual choices are
proper exercises of personal freedom. Justice is not fully understand-
able without consideration of its quality as a virtue, and the field of
practical judgment shall remain obscure unless all its ethical dimen-
sions are taken into account. Sensitive insight and scientific method
have greatly improved our understanding of decisionmaking. If we
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add the moral imperatives of the autonomous decisionmaker 9 we gain
a deeper understanding of the dimensions of judgment. To make our
comprehension complete, we need to become aware of how processes
of choice involve the moral perfection, as well as the autonomous free-
dom, of the one who must choose. The transition from abstract norm
to specific choice is a continuous movement towards action, a thrust of
thought and will whose practical character culminates in the virtue of
prudence.
PRUDENCE
Prudence is a highly misunderstood term. Its common usage in-
dudes a sense of timidity if not outright perversity. Given this over-
growth of negative meaning, it is difficult to correlate the word with
sentiments of moral excellence. Nonetheless, developments in the
search for an understanding of human judgment encourage a restate-
ment of its significance. At a point where scientific discipline ends and
personal freedom begins, there is a vacuum susceptible of additional
knowledge. Our abhorrence of arbitrary action suggests the need to
bring the realm of indeterminate choice as much as possible within
the measure of moral reason.
The general relevance of prudence can be best understood in rela-
tion to "subjective" theories of justice. Thinkers such as Radbruch and
Perelman have taken pains to point out that the problem of justice
can only be understood in terms of the innate impulse of an indi-
vidual to be just. For Radbruch, this inward thrust explained the
phenomena of law as a value-related phenomena; for Perelman the
moral imperatives of the autonomous self were the modem source of
prophetic justice. The moral drives of the individual become the
primary criteria of goodness.' 0 By contrast, Thomism insists that urges
towards justice do not, of themselves, constitute virtue. Inner impera-
tives must gain the additional ethical qualities associated with prudence
if jural impulses are to become good actions."
9. See notes 2-3 supra. See also G. DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE (Guthrie transl. 1956);
G. DEL VECOHIO, MAN AND NATURE (R. Newman ed., A. Campbell transl. 1969).
For a critique of Rawl's Theory of Justice relevant to the present discussion, see
Murphy, Distributive Justice, Its Modern Significance, 17 At. J. JUR. 153, 162-65
(1972).
10. This emphasis is also evident in an important new casebook. See W. Bisiun
& C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS (1972); cf. Murphy, Book Review, 25 J.
LEGAL ED. 492 (1972).
11. T. AQUINAS, SumMA THEOLOGICA II-II Q. 47-56. See J. PIEPER, PRUDENCE
JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT
The conflict between idealism and Thomism on this point is not
as extreme as it may first appear. Perelman acknowledges that impera-
tives need a moderating influence; in the concept of the just rule, the
self's sense of righteousness is conditioned by the need for rational
justification. And on the plane of anthropological evidence, studies
of the judicial process demonstrate that personal imperatives do not,
without more, constitute human justice. There is a growing conviction
that judges do not have a "roving commission to do good"; their imme-
diate inclinations must be tempered by a consideration for decided
tradition, the place of the judiciary in the total scheme of govern-
ment, and the capacity of a particular people to absorb the require-
ments of abstract right at a given time in their history.12 The just de-
cision, in addition to its ethicalness, is also encompassed by broader
considerations of reason. These reflections find a parallel in the struc-
ture of prudence considered as a moral power or ability of the decision-
maker.
Prudence commands the immediate decision; it is thus highly
volitional in character. But it also has cognitive characteristics. Its
function is to determine the requirements of the here and now, but it
implies a knowing. It assumes a will formed by the good as well as
shaped by concrete realities. If stress is laid upon the existential aspect
of human conduct, the individual's immediate sense of right is in the
foreground of action. But to make this self-perspective the absolute
source of justice would be an incomplete interpretation of moral re-
sponsibility. Just judgments are not only the realization of norms
which the autonomous ego gives to oneself; the wisdom of prudential
judgments implies that the actor has nourished his volition on a wide
range of extramental truths.
In any ethical decision, personal conscience must be the primary
guide. Thus, positive efforts towards the realization of justice have
immediate subjective causes. The leading figures in struggles with
injustice point to this voice of conscience as the source of the impera-
tives which they have sought to realize. But if we are to form a com-
(1959) (providing a general exposition of prudence as a central moral virtue). For the
incorporation of prudence into legal philosophy, see Dabin, General Theory of Law, in
2 THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES or LASE, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN (K. Wilk transl. 1950).
See also Murphy, Some Implications of Thomistic Jurisprudence, 36 TUL. L. REv. 687
(1962).
12. See generally A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH (1962); K.
LLEWELLVN, THE COMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
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prehensive understanding of human judgment, it is necessary to push
reflection beyond the personal conviction of what ought to be. Motiva-
tion is a complex phenomenon involving cultural conditioning, sub-
conscious drives, aversions and affinities, as well as existential aspira-
tions towards fulfillment. A single choice reflects an immense variety
of influences, many of which elude rational scrutiny. But if we are to
deepen our understanding of human affairs, the effort must be made
to identify those aspects of human judgment which, by general assent,
can be equated with reason.
The emphasis upon rationality implied by prudence refers to the
entire spectrum of truths which bear, remotely as well as immediately,
upon the requirements of decision. Beyond the norms derived from
self-consciousness, the acting self is circumscribed by all the given data
relevant to the problem for which he must find a just solution. Modem
thought has accentuated the concrete factors to which the actor must
be responsive if his judgments are to be acceptable. Emphasis upon
contextual considerations, the profound importance of evidentiary
facts, the phenomenological features of justice, these, and related in-
sights, dominate modem analyses of the problem. A consideration of
judgment as the expression of personal virtue can expand the range
of relevant considerations without contradicting these truths about the
nature of decisionmaking.
The perspective of personal perfection involves the full informa-
tion of moral intelligence; it means that desires for justice can be im-
proved through an adherence to all truths which give meaning to
free choice. That the demands of prudential judgment require per-
sonal assent to the ontological as well as the existential modes of nat-
ural law and justice is one consequence of such an ideal.
Prudence is primarily concerned with means rather than ends,
yet it seeks to achieve that which has already been willed.18 A partial
understanding of moral truths impairs our ability to make choices
consonant with the overall purposes of human existence. Without an
insistence upon personal adherence to objective truth, responsibility
is enhanced only to the extent of making one conscious of the diver-
gent values which comprise the potentials of a decision. Given his
premise of moral relativism, Radbruch could improve upon natural
13. This does not mean that a specific situation is to be subsumed under a general
category, or that "answers" can be deduced from abstract norms. One's general under-
standing has a real but indistinct influence upon concrete choice.
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preferences only by increasing consciousness of value possibilities and
the diversity of ideological persuasion. To some extent contemporary
sociological jurisprudence seeks the same objective, since its rigorous
method draws one's attention to the distributions of value implicit in
choice. Much of this is, of course, to the good. Given a concrete as-
sertion of contrary values, those responsible for resolving such disputes
must have a sound grasp of the available options and consequences.
But such methodology is incapable on its premises of reaching the
deeper basis of personal responsibility. No matter how precisely de-
veloped, social sciences do not exhaust the personal obligation to
pursue an ultimate structure of values. Such an effort is assumed by
the concept of prudential judgment.
Personal moral imperatives must be supplemented by ontological
articulations of ethics,14 but this does not exclude moral insights
gained through other modalities of knowing from the scope of pru-
dence. All good is embraced by the virtue; this assimilative quality
makes it possible to see how differing concepts of justice all play a
part in developing the ability to make right decisions. Brecht, a mod-
em jurist, discovered by phenomonological reflection that judgments,
to be just,15 must be based upon a general scheme of values rather than
upon the arbitrary selection of preferred norms. From his study of
Western man's efforts to be just, Stone concluded that one quasi-abso-
lute was the ideal that actions should affect all persons involved
equally, unless there were sufficient reasons for doing otherwise. 6
Such insights are of great importance to the realization of justice; they
acquire added significance when viewed as truths of which a prudent
decisionmaker must become aware if his choices are to be a proper
exercise of freedom.
The same spirit of inclusiveness applies to existential truths about
personal encounters. A sense of human fraternity, the creative justice
which listens, gives, and forgives, these and similar intuitions all con-
tribute to the development of personal responsibility. They are all
14. For the relationship between moral knowledge and practical choice, see S.
HAMPsHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACTION (1960). See also J. MARITAIN, MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(1964). That the same knowledge of good and evil influences one's conception of legal
theory is evident in Professor Hall's approach to criminal law. See J. HALL, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 87-100 (1973). In the present essay only the general connec-
tion between ethical knowledge and decision can be noted.
15. A. BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY- ch. X, XII (1959);- Brecht, The Ultimate
Standard of Justice, in Nomos VI JUSTICE (1963).
16. J. STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMITAN EXISTENCE 343-44 (1965).
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aspects of moral truth to which the self must refer if one's inclina-
tions are to be fully oriented towards the accomplishment of authentic
good.
Prudence implies a knowledge of reality as well as a realization
of the good. An openness to moral truths gains further enhancement
from general truths about humanity. The more one knows of man
and the more one learns from science and the humanities, the better
equipped one is to persuasively advance a cause and to wisely adjust
human conflict. The broader bases of prudence are more immediately
evident in the dependence upon reality which is essential to its de-
liberative aspects. The "Brandeis brief" proved the importance of
socioeconomic data to the just resolution of controversies; and modern
legal science has become increasingly conscious of how varied human
disciplines impinge upon the resolution of jural problems. The deeper
significance of these interdependencies is revealed in the traditional
requirement that the ability to make proper decisions depends upon
one's willingness to be instructed by the competence of others.
The given "data" for proper judgment includes not only moral,
scientific and humanistic truths but also the more immediate knowl-
edge which can be supplied by professional economists, physicians, or
practitioners of any other relevant discipline. No single perspective
can adequately plumb the nature of a claim for redress or change;
those called to find official solutions must be opened to all available
perspectives which can illuminate the contours of responsible decision.
Such dependence does not mean servility; the decisionmaker retains
his autonomy and accountability for what occurs within his authority.
The proper balance between free choice and intrusion of alien disci-
plines depends upon the intrinsic ability of the individual official to
evaluate the worth of each contribution. Law cannot, for example, be
ignorant of psychiatry; it is a wise lawyer, or judge, 17 who can delineate
its significance for the resolution of legal issues. And such a power of
discernment depends in large measure upon the breadth of moral
and cultural knowledge which the person brings with him to his de-
cisional tasks.
The achievement of a balance is an important objective of pru-
dence, the ability of a person to move creatively between extremes
17. The juror also has responsibilities. See Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d
665 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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is often indicative of the presence of the virtue. Admittedly, the con-
crete realization of justice requires prophets, and their insight often
transcends measure. But if we wish to trace the general contours of
reason applied to action, some sense of balanced order is essential,
even though its standards may be prosaic.
Various themes of balance have grown out of reflections on pru-
dential judgment. One important component is the emphasis upon the
here and now. The self is, as Heidegger observed, a being in the
world.' Choices are not made in an abstract vacuum, they are made in
the context of involvement with others, especially those affected by
the decision. Demand for rational persuasion can temper the moral im-
pulses of one authorized to decide, but such criteria are not the only
limits upon the desire of an autonomous ego to accomplish what it be-
lieves to be justice. Some sense of the possible is indispensible to moral
decision; and it is this restraint which is most difficult to reconcile
with righteousness. That one must respect the actual capacity of the
governed to assimilate an abstract norm is particularly abhorrent to
those whose insights are avant-garde.
This dimension of prudence is especially important in contempo-
rary society where the ideals of human liberty have become an opera-
tive part of social policy. The more perceptive advocates and decision-
makers are aware of the movement of history, they are intensely con-
scious of the primary moral value of human freedom and dignity.
Personally committed to advance these goals, they are impatient with
qualifications which they are prone to treat as evasions. In some cases,
a so-called "prudence" is in reality a strategy of avoidance or subter-
fuge; yet there is a substratum of objective truth behind the general
notion of considered judgment. Unthinking realization of ideals, no
matter how noble in themselves, can only, in the long run, have de-
structive consequences. 9 The good judgment must reconcile opposites
and harmonize the discordant clash of values which make up the es-
sence of human antagonisms. Expression must be reconciled with repu-
tation,20 art with morals, the liberties of an accused with the general
18. See M. HEEDEGGER, ON BEING AND TIME (J. Stambaugh transl. 1972).
19. There are historical illustrations. The inflexibility of President Wilson on im-
portant questions had a detrimental effect upon his foreign policy; the dogmatism of
the Allende government undoubtedly contributed to the recent Chilean chaos.
20. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (where a balance is
struck between the values of free and vigorous discussion protected by the first amend-
ment and the right to a reputation traditionally protected by the laws of defamation).
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security, and all this requires some conscious effort to reconcile oppo-
sites, rather than an uncompromising insistence upon the immediate
implementation of a perceived good.
But if circumspection and foresight are a part of wisdom, undue
caution is an essential deficiency. Respect for established precedent
and procedures is an integral part of authoritative lawmaking, but
excessive reliance upon tradition may suggest moral weakness. Adamant
resistance to change or adjustment reflects a myriad of psychic influ-
ences. The very structure of modern mass society encourages a kind
of pervasive anxiety which results in hostility towards anyone who
would modify the prevailing manner of life. Uncritical attachment to
abstract ideals leads to what Marcel has called the "fanaticized con-
sciousness," a disease which can affect persons of either liberal or con-
servative persuasion.2 1 Beyond these, and other possible psycho-cultural
causes, the phenomena of inordinate caution are to some extent sus-
ceptible of ethical scrutiny.
Such imprudence, according to Thomistic tradition, is grounded
upon covetousness, a vice referring primarily to an inordinate love of
wealth, but which also encompasses the more basic anxieties which we
associate with a desperate self-preservation or grasping for security.
Such attitudes are fundamentally inimical to authentic prudence be-
cause unreasonable reserve obstructs the accomplishment of justice.
Timidness is opposed to that fortitude which is essential if each is
to be given what is his due.
The qualifications introduced by prudence may seem to make it
inhospitable to the freedom of the one poised for action. But the
same stress upon circumstances which may restrain jural impulses also
accentuates the liberty of the decisionmaker. Focus upon the particular
situation emphasizes the deliberation which must precede judgment;
it also affirms that the immediate measure of action is the imperative
of prudence in the person who must decide. What the choice shall be
depends upon a perception of specifics which are only accessible to the
one with the relevant responsibility. It rests with his living experi-
ences; 22 only he is privy to all the contingencies which envelope his
problem.
21. See G. MARCEL, MAN AGAINST MASS SOCIETY (G. S. Fraser transl. 1962).
See also E. HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER (1951).
22. See B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) (which reveals an acute
consciousness of these nuances).
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CONCLUSION
These ideas gain confirmation from legal science. The phe-
nomenon of law is increasingly being understood as a decisionmaking
process. Law results from the establishment of authority to create
rules. This truth emerges from a modem understanding of the judicial
process, which stresses the indeterminancy of precedent and the con-
scious decisional choice of judges. It also emerges from more struc-
tural interpretations of positive law. The existence and growth of
law is dependent upon the will and creativity of those empowered
to make it.23
The fact that law is a problem-solving process also emphasizes its
relation to choice. Legal rules result from the solution of jural prob-
lems: a question for executive determination, the formulation of legis-
lative or administrative policy, or the adjudication of an adversary
dispute. It is essentially a job to be done rather than a truth to be dis-
covered. Understood as a means to an end-as actions by which
jural institutions, rules and procedures are adapted to the purposes
of civilized life-law is essentially a function of the practical reason.
Remotely dependent upon speculative understanding, it is immediately
dependent upon judgment.
These truths-which ironically arise from the complementary in-
sights of Thomism and positivism-carry human understanding of the
personal dimensions of decisionmaking beyond the probings of sub-
jective philosophy. Radbruch demonstrated that exterior phenomena
of positive law were essentially related to individual inclinations
towards justice; but neither he, nor subsequent subjective thinkers,
perceived the deeper significance of this personal link. Del Vecchio's
emphasis upon self-consciousness ignored the mental operations of de-
liberation and choice; Perelman suspends the search for inner causal-
ity by imposing the objective criteria of argumentation upon the
moral imperatives of the deciding official. The connections between
positive law and the lawmaker can only be fully understood in the
light of the quality of practical reason within the one who decides.
Dabin puts it explicitly: "Law is prudence." 24
23. Such complimentary insights can be seen in Kelsen's idea of law creating within
a dynamic system of norms and Hart's idea of secondary rules, especially of change and
adjudication. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1962); H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY
OF LAW (1967).
24. Dabin, General Theory of Law, in 4 TWENTIETH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSO-
577
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As a moral virtue, prudence is the discernment and effective reali-
zation of means most appropriate to moral ends; similarly the jural
decisionmaker must adapt legal rules to the pursuits of civilization.
The characterization of law as jurisprudence reflects the close affinity
between the ethical and juridic realms. And in creating rules-in
being prudent-the decisionmaker possesses, in large measure, that
subjective freedom of choice which has been traditionally identified
as an integral part of the virtue.
The affirmation of freedom which flows from the dependence of
law upon prudence is not a sanction for arbitrary action. The liberty
of one authorized to choose is limited by the institutional framework
within which he works. He must be responsive to the allocations of
competence designated by constitution or custom; expectations that he
will act with the guidance of received precedents also restrict the avail-
able options. Whatever choices have been made must be defended by
techniques of authoritative persuasion. 25 Yet the decision itself must
rest with the personal conscience of the authorized official.
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